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The First Amendment and "Scalping"
by a Financial Columnist:
May a Newspaper Article Be Commercial Speech?
In Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,1 a financial columnist for a daily newspaper
bought stock in a company, then wrote a column recommending the stock
without disclosing his ownership of shares and profited on the rise in
the market resulting from the favorable article.' The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that such conduct, which is known as "scalping,""
violates section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rule
10b-51 promulgated under this section.' This note examines whether a col-
umn written by a journalist for the purpose of scalping is commercial
speech and therefore less protected by the first amendment than non-
commercial speech."
594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
2 Id. at 1264-65. For details of the transaction, see notes 92-98 & accompanying text infra.
3 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963); SEC v. Wall
St. Transcript Corp., 454 F. Supp. 559, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,
and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322,
368 (1979); Peskind, Regulation of the Financial Press: A New Dimension to Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 80, 81 (1969).
15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
The "Commission" is the Securities and Exchange Commission. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 S 3(aX15), 15 U.S.C. S 78c(aX15) (1976).
5 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1981). This rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
' Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d at 1266-67; accord, Peskind, supra note 3, at 82.
7 For the test protecting commercial speech, see text accompanying note 189 infra.
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The task of defining commercial speech has created difficulty.8 In Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,' the
Supreme Court of the United States described such speech as "expres-
sion related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."1° The Court also recited the earlier definition "'speech pro-
posing a commercial transaction.' ,,' The Court recently repeated the first
definition in In re R_ M. J ,11 but omitted the second definition.
This note concludes that the first definition fails to withstand analysis
and that the second comports with an analysis of commercial speech as
"a means of forming commitments which are potentially part of the con-
tract of sale"13 and reflects the Court's actual treatment of commercial
speech cases.
The majority in Central Hudson set out the test applied to governmen-
tal regulation of commercial speech. The first amendment protects such
speech from regulation only if the speech concerns lawful activity and
is not misleading.14 A governmental unit may regulate even such protected
expression if the regulation "directly advances"1 a "substantial" govern-
mental interest and "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest."' 7 In In re R_ _ M. J____ , the Court stressed Central Hud-
son's observation that the regulation "must be in proportion to"18 the
governmental interest.
This note argues that a columnist's scalping article fits the second defini-
tion of commercial speech -speech proposing a commercial transaction -
but that treating the column as such speech is undesirable for two reasons.
First, the extent to which the editorial content of a newspaper 9 might
8 E.g., Schaefer, The First Amendment, Media Conglomerate and "Business" Corpora-
tions: Can Corporations Safely Involve Themselves in the Political Process?, 55 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1, 34-40 (1980); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 12-15, at 656 (1978)
("[Tihere are ... hard cases-is the coal company's ad proclaiming its concern for environ-
ment and warning of the hazards of nuclear fuel commercial speech or political expres-
sion? .... ").9 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
0 Id. at 561.
1 Id. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
12 50 U.S.L.W. 4185, 4189 n.17 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1982) (No. 80-1431).
Is Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372, 389
(1979).
' 447 U.S. at 566.
Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.; see id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); Cox, The Supreme Court,
1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. R.v. 1,35-36
(1980); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 164 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
1979 Term].
is In re R_ M. J_ 50 U.S.L.W. at 4189; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 564.
" In commercial speech cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that speech by broad-
casters poses special problems which could require separate analysis. See Bates v. State
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be deemed commercial speech if scalping articles were treated as such
is unclear and therefore such treatment may have a chilling effect on non-
commercial speech. Second, the Central Hudson test affords insufficient
protection to the article because the test appears not to balance the
government's interest in regulation of this instance of commercial speech
against countervailing interests in the speech. Instead, an analogy to the
Investment Advisers Act of 194020 suggests that the Court's commercial
speech analysis may permit regulations that would be unacceptable in-
trusions on freedom of the press. The note observes that a solution is
to recognize that speech may be commercial in varying degrees2 1 and to
modify the Central Hudson test in two ways: first, to protect even
misleading commercial speech from prior restraint when a less intrusive
regulation will suffice, and second, to weigh the governmental interest
in regulation against the first amendment interests restricted by the
regulation.' The emphasis in In re R_ M. J___ on proportionality may
signal that the Court intends such balancing.
THE DEFINITION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The Supreme Court originally appeared to deny protection to commer-
cial speech. Forty years ago in Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court said'
that although states and municipalities "may not unduly burden or
proscribe"2' dissemination of information or opinion in public streets," "the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects pure-
ly commercial advertising."' Valentine was often interpreted to mean that
the first amendment does not protect commercial speech." Thirty-three
years after Valentine the Court suggested in Bigelow v. Virginiae that
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 387 (1973). For this reason, this note does not deal with
the speech of broadcasters. The special problems presumably include the theory that scarc-
ity of broadcast frequencies justifies greater regulation of broadcasts than of other media,
e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-90, 396-401 (1969).
15 U.S.C. S 80b (1976).
21 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
2 Id.




E.g., Farber, supra note 13, at 377 (citing J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, HAND-
BOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 767 (1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-15, at 653 n.16 (1978));
Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 40 0HIo
ST. L.J. 115, 116-17 (1979). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court acknowledged that earlier cases, including Valen-
tine and Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), contained some indication of a lack of
first amendment protection for commercial speech. 425 U.S. at 758-59.
2 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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commercial speech is entitled to some first amendment protection.'
Bigelow recognized such protection for an abortion referral service adver-
tisement which reported the legality of abortion in another state, however,
and therefore involved speech on a matter of "'public interest.' "" Not
until Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,1 in which the Court struck down a ban on pharmacists'
advertising of prescription drug prices, did the Court hold that purely
commercial speech enjoys some degree of first amendment protection.'
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,"
one of a series of casesu following Virginia State Board, the Court analyzed
a state public service commission's regulation banning advertising by elec-
tric utilities to promote use of electricity." Although the Court found such
advertising to be a form of commercial speech,0 it held that the first
amendment prohibits a ban on such advertising.' In analyzing the issue,
the Court considered commercial speech to be speech related to economic
interests' and speech proposing commercial transactions. 9
0
Commercial Speech as an Expression Related to Economic Interests
The Court's definition of commercial speech as "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience"40 appears to
be a new formulation. The Court did not explain the definition, but rather
appended it to the observation that the regulation involved in the case
"restricts only commercial speech."41 Justice Stevens, concurring in the
judgment in Central Hudson, persuasively criticized the definition, first
by noting that it is unclear whether the definition refers to "the subject
' See id. at 826. The Bigelow Court said that such protection had been indicated in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), and in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973). 421 U.S. at 819-21. Sullivan
involved political speech, see 376 U.S. at 266, and Pittsburgh Press involved commercial
speech used for an illegal commercial activity, 413 U.S. at 389.
421 U.S. at 822.
1, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 770.
13 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
1 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
' 447 U.S. at 558.
" See id. at 561, 566-71.
3 Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
40 Id. at 561.
41 Id. The Court followed the definition with citations to Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 762; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977); and Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979), but the definition
was not used in any of these cases.
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matter of the speech or the motivation of the speaker,"4 and second, by
arguing that in either case, the definition is too broad:
Neither a labor leader's exhortation to strike, nor an economist's disser-
tation on the money supply, should receive any lesser protection
because the subject matter concerns only the economic interests of
the audience. Nor should the economic motivation of a speaker qualify
his constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may have been
motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward. 3
Nevertheless, in In re R. M. J.. a unanimous Court recited the
definition and applied it to the facts of that case," in which the Court
held that certain restrictions in Missouri on attorneys' advertising were
unconstitutional as applied to the appellant lawyer.45 The Court wrote:
"By describing his services and qualifications, appellant's sole purpose
was to encourage members of the public to engage him for personal
profit."'" This focus on "sole purpose" indicates that the definition refers
to motivation, but that this is indeed the meaning is not clear because
a description of services and qualifications is subject matter. Moreover,
the Court did not make clear whether the "personal profit" was the pro-
fit of the attorney, the public, or both, though the definitional phrase "the
speaker and its audience" suggests that the reference was to both.
If the phrase "economic interests" refers to economic motivation, the
definition contrasts with the Court's previous attitude that looking to the
primary motivation of the writer or publisher could endanger commen-
' 447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
', Id. at 579-S0; accord, Schaefer, supra note 8, at 38-39. Justice Stevens also quoted
Farber, supra note 13, at 382-83 (footnotes omitted): "'Economic motivation could not be
made a disqualifying factor [from maximum protection] without enormous damage to the
first amendment. Little purpose would be served by a first amendment which failed to
protect newspapers, paid public speakers, political candidates with partially economic motives
and professional authors.'" 447 U.S. at 580 n.2.
" 50 U.S.L.W. at 4189 n.17. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882
(1981), the plurality applied the Central Hudson analysis to an ordinance that in part pro-
hibited outdoor billboards containing commercial speech. The plurality said the ordinance's
partial ban on commercial speech was constitutional, id. at 2895, but found the ordinance
unconstitutional because it prohibited noncommercial speech on billboards even more than
it prohibited commercial speech, id. at 2899. The opinion did not recite a definition of com-
mercial speech.
11 Id. at 4189-90. The Court reversed the Supreme Court of Missouri, id. at 4190, which
had upheld the constitutionality of the restrictions and issued a private reprimand to the
lawyer, id. at 4187; In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1981) ("We are urged now by
respondent to follow the Central Hudson model. We respectfully decline to enter the thicket
of attempting to anticipate and to satisfy the subjective ad hoc judgments of a majority
of the justices of the United States Supreme Court." (emphasis in original)). The alleged
violations against which the United States Supreme Court found the attorney to be con-
stitutionally protected were describing his practice in unauthorized language, listing jurisdic-
tions where he was admitted to practice, and mailing unauthorized announcement cards.
50 U.S.L.W. at 4189.11 50 U.S.L.W. at 4189 n.17.
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tary that should be protected.? For example, that a publisher sells
newspapers or receives payment to publish an advertisement expressing
opinions and seeking financial support for the civil rights movement does
not bar the publisher from the full protection of the first amendment.48
If the economic motivation at stake is that of the audience rather than
that of the speaker, the definition remains unsatisfactory. A profit-seeking
businessman's access to a dissertation on the money supply still seems
entitled to the full protection of the first amendment.
Even before Central Hudson, subject matter was soundly criticized as
a basis for distinguishing commercial speech from noncommercial speech
because the same products or services that are the subject of commercial
advertising also are the subject of speech by consumer advocates, who
deserve the full protection of the first amendment. 9 Furthermore, "infor-
mation about the quality and price of some products may relate to impor-
tant political issues."'
Although the Court in Central Hudson apparently attempted to limit
the boundaries of commercial speech by defining it as "expression related
solely to... economic interests,' 5 1 the word "solely" does not accomplish
this purpose. If "solely" means that the speaker must have only an
economic motivation, then a labor leader who for economic reasons ex-
horts employees to strike and an author who writes a pulp book only
because of the potential for profit seem to engage in commercial speech,
but an advertisement whose writer to any extent seeks esthetically pleas-
" Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 818; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1973); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474
(1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Comment, First Amend-
ment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 205, 209 (1976); see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S 350, 363-64 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 761; Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
48 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); see Rotunda, The Commer-
cial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1087-88.
"9 Farber, supra note 13, at 381-82. In Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the Court said that content must be what characterizes commer-
cial speech. 425 U.S. at 761. However, the Court then observed that "speech whose content
deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject." Id.
Farber, supra note 13, at 382.
447 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the
Court said it saw no "satisfactory distinction" between speech by contestants in a labor
dispute and commercial speech. 425 U.S. at 762-63; see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 383 (1977). However, the Court then cited four cases which did not analyze labor
contestants' speech as commercial speech, but rather seemed to treat the speech in a more
general first amendment analysis. 425 U.S. at 762 (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); AFL
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)). Thorn-




ing wording seems to be outside the definition. Moreover, determining
whether a person had only one motivation would be difficult. Indeed, a
speaker's choice of words is probably seldom motivated only by an
economic interest. If commercial speech must contain "solely" subject mat-
ter related to economic interests, the labor leader's exhortation, the
economist's dissertation, and product information still seem to fit the
definition as well as do product advertisements. Such a result is
undesirable because of society's interest in protecting labor's decision-
making process, scholarly economic analysis, and information about pro-
ducts whose safety, quality, and price are matters of public concern.
Furthermore, if commercial speech is defined "solely" by economic
motivation, the definition is inconsistent with the facts of In re R
-M. J. and with some prior cases. In In re R_ M. J___ , the areas
of practice which the attorney advertised included "Criminal," "Divorce,
Separation," and "Custody, Adoption."' That the typical client seeks
counsel in these areas solely for the purpose of profit seems unlikely.
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro," the Court found
"For Sale" signs on real estate to be commercial speech- even though
one motivation for their use apparently was not the mere expectation
of a decline in property values as neighborhoods changed from white to
black, but rather the racial fears of white homeowners. In Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona,57 the Court decided that two attorneys engaged in com-
mercial speech' by advertising the routine services of their legal clinic59
even though the attorneys were motivated in part by a desire to furnish
legal services to persons of moderate income' and thus not merely by
the desire to make a profit. Moreover, the Bates advertisement also con-
In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concern-
ing the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free
discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution .... Free discussion con-
cerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears
to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of
popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.
310 U.S. at 102-03. The Court in Virginia State Bd. also said that "[w]e ... advert to cases
in the labor field only to note that in some circumstances speech of an entirely private
and economic character enjoys the protection of the First Amendment." 425 U.S. at 763
n.17; see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977).
50 U.S.L.W. at 4190 app. A.
431 U.S. 85 (1977).
See id at 91-92.
See id. at 88,'90-91. The Court found that an ordinance banning such signs, id. at 86,
violated the first amendment, id at 97.
57 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
See id. at 363-82.
5 Id. at 354.
Id. The lawyers placed their advertisement in order to generate enough business to
enable the clinic to survive. Id. The Court decided that application to the attorneys of
a disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers' advertising, id. at 355, violated the first amend-
ment, id. at 384.
1982]
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cerned representation in uncontested divorces and adoptions. 1 Hence, in
Linmark and Bates, the speakers' interests were not solely profit, and
in In re R__ M. J._ and Bates, the audience's interests were not solely
profit.
Similarly, if the definition refers "solely" to economic subject matter,
the definition is inconsistent with the facts of In re R . M. J__ and
with prior cases. The representation in divorces and adoptions advertis-
ed in In re R_ M. J__ and Bates is not solely, nor even primarily,
economic in the view of the audience to which the advertisements were
directed. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,62 the Court recognized that "an individual adver-
tisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest."'
Among the Court's examples were advertisements for abortion referral
services and the promotion of the use of artificial furs as an alternative
to causing the extinction of some mammals."
Commercial Speech as the Proposal of a Commercial Transaction
The Court did not expound upon the second definition of commercial
speech contained in Central Hudson either. The Court formulated this
definition, that commercial speech is "'speech proposing a commercial
transaction,' "I in the earlier case of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association"
and suggested that the distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech is merely "'commonsense.' "67
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment in Central Hudson, argued
that this definition "may be somewhat too narrow."68 He explained that
01 Id. at 354, 385.
62 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 764.
"Id.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
0 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). The Court previously defined commercial speech as speech
"which does no more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), quoted in Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 762. For a discussion
of this definition, see note 90 infra.
447 U.S. at 562 (quoting 436 U.S. at 455-56). The full quotation noted "the 'commonsense
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech." The word
"commonsense" seems to add virtually nothing to the definition. On the one hand, it seems
to be commonsense that the editorial content of a newspaper should not be considered
commercial speech. On the other hand, it seems to be commonsense that a seller who recom-
mends purchase of his product should be deemed to engage in commercial speech. Both
descriptions fit the case of the scalping columnist. For analysis suggesting that the latter
view reflects the current definition of commercial speech, see notes 99-115 & accompany-
ing text infra.
447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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it includes "[a] salesman's solicitation, a broker's offer, and a manufac-
turer's publication of a price list or the terms of his standard warranty,"69
and might extend as far as "other communications that do little more
than make the name of a product or a service more familiar to the general
public."7 He concluded that "[w]hatever the precise contours of the con-
cept, .... it should not include the entire range of communication that
is embraced within the term 'promotional advertising.' "71
Justice Stevens thus recognized the difficulty of determining where
the line between commercial and noncommercial speech is drawn using
this definition. The definition focuses, however, on certain of the attributes
of commercial speech, including one that a commentator has used in
distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech: "In addition to be-
ing a means of conveying information, commercial speech is also a means
of forming commitments which are potentially part of the contract of sale.
This trait serves to identify commercial speech."72 Under both this con-
tractual analysis and the Court's analysis commercial speech consists of
representations or misrepresentations which are made by or on behalf
of one potential party to a commercial transaction and which may bind
that party.
The second definition in Central Hudson apparently is broad enough
to include a seller's mere repetition of a brand name to make it more
familiar. In Friedman v. Rogers"3 the Court upheld a state law against
optometry practice under a trade name. The Court explained that a trade
name "has no intrinsic meaning,"" but may acquire meaning over time
as the public associates the name with a standard of price or quality. 5
After sufficient use, a trade name may "identify an optometrical practice
and . . .convey information about the type, price, and quality of ser-
vices .... In each role, the trade name is used as part of a proposal of
a commercial transaction. '76 The Court observed that the public could be
1, Id. at 580.
70 Id.
"1 Id. Justice Stevens consequently considered the speech in Central Hudson not to be
commercial. Id. at 581.
7' Farber, supra note 13, at 389. Although Professor Farber deemed the difference be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech to be "that the commercial speaker not only
talks about a product, but also sells it," id. at 386, a purchaser seems also to be able to
engage in commercial speech. Such might be the case, for instance, when a corporation
buys back stock from a shareholder, and when a newspaper columnist writes an unfavorable
story about a company whose stock he intends to purchase after the story causes a decline
in the price. Professor Farber recognized the applicability of his analysis to securities regula-
tions' requirements of disclosure. Id. at 393-94.
440 U.S. 1 (1979).
7' Id. at 12. Words are symbols and therefore lack intrinsic meaning. See E. TRAUGOTT
& M. PRATT, LINGUISTICS FOR STUDENTS OF LITERATURE 4-5, 7 (1980).
75 440 U.S. at 12.
11 Id. at 11. "Proposal" may mean "[a]n offer ... the acceptance whereof will make a
contract," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1097 (5th ed. 1979), or "[t]he initial overture or preliminary
1982]
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deceived if the trade name remained unchanged after departure of the
optometrists whose skill had attracted public patronage.77 Because a mere
part of a proposal may be commercial speech, Friedman establishes that
in the definition "speech proposing a commercial transaction," the word
"proposing" must be read rather broadly. The trade name problem fits
the contractual analysis because "[d]eception about the identity of a par-
ty to the transaction relates directly to the contractual nature of the trans-
action and is a classical ground for avoiding a contract.""8 A similar ra-
tionale applies to brand names. 9
The contractual analysis and the Court's second definition are consis-
tent with the results in cases in which commercial speech has been
treated0 since the Court returned to the subject in 1973.81 The Court has
deemea commercial speech to include such proposals as classified adver-
tisements of employment opportunities," advertisements by pharmacists
of prices of prescription drugs,' "For Sale" signs on lawns of houses,"
advertising of fees for routine legal services,85 in-person soliciting of a
client by an attorney,88 advertising by electric utilities promoting use of
electricity,' and, apparently, advertising of contraceptives,' as well as
optometry practice under a trade name.' Accordingly, this note will apply
the Court's second definition 0 in an analysis of whether a newspaper ar-
statement [which] is not an offer but.., contemplates an offer," id. The Court apparently
intends the second meaning and applies it broadly.
440 U.S. at 12-13.
s Farber, supra note 13, at 396 (footnote omitted).
The Court probably would find that the state in at least most instances may fulfill
its interest in regulation of a brand name by means other than suppression of use of the
brand name. For the test applied to governmental regulation of commercial speech, in-
cluding consideration of whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve
the governmental interest asserted, see text accompanying note 189 infra.
'o See Schaefer, supra note 8, at 38.
sl Farber, supra note 13, at 377.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973). In a subsequent case, the Court said that an advertisement for an abortion referral
service "did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material
of clear 'public interest.'" Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 822. For discussion of speech
which seems both commercial and noncommercial, see note 90 infra.
' Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
at 760-61.
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 91-92.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 363-66, 383-84.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 455-57.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 566.
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977).
' Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. at 8-16.
In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, the Court indicated that
commercial speech includes "statements [on public issues] made only in the context of com-
mercial transactions." 447 U.S. at 562 n.5. Further, in a passage which seems to suggest
that commercial speech includes only "advertising," the Court said, "The First Amend-
ment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertis-
ing." Id. at 563. However, the Court did not suggest that all advertising is commercial
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ticle written by a scalping financial columnist may be commercial speech.9'
speech. See id. at 562 n.5 ("utilities enjoy the full panoply of First Amendment protections
for their direct comments on public issues"); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964) (full first amendment protection for "'editorial advertisements' ").
The reference to statements made only in the context of commercial transactions ap-
parently means that the mixing of noncommercial and commercial aspects in some speech
will not exclude the mixture from the definition of commercial speech. See Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5. This result is appealing
because it seems that a speaker should not be able to avoid having speech treated as com-
mercial simply by adding a noncommercial element. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 831-32
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 47, at 227; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 764-65; Farber, supra note 13, at 387-88; 8
IND. L. REV. 890, 896-97 (1975). Nevertheless, the result raises problems discussed below.
The Court's suggestion that commercial speech might be limited to advertising seems
to be too narrow and also to add nothing useful to the definition. That limitation to adver-
tising is too narrow is shown by the example of a broker's offer as commercial speech.
The offer could be private. A private offer is not generally considered "advertising" because
"advertising" means "making public intimation or announcement of anything, whether by
publication in newspapers, or by handbills, or by oral proclamation." 2A C.J.S. Advertising
(1972) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing People v. Montague, 280 Mich. 610, 619,
274 N.W. 347, 351 (1937) (quoting same language from earlier printing of CORPUS JURIS
SECUNDUM); McDonough v. Board of Educ., 20 Misc. 2d 98,99, 189 N.Y.S.2d 401,404 (Sup. Ct.
1959) (quoting same language from CORPUS JURIS)). If on the other hand "advertising" were
so broadly defined as to include a private offer, it would seem to refer to the same concept
as "statements made in the context of commercial transactions" and to add virtually nothing
to the definition of commercial speech.
The Court previously suggested that commercial speech is speech "which does no more
than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), quoted in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 762; see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.
at 11 n.10; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 822; Comment, Regulating Commercial Speech:
A Conceptual Frameworkfor Analysis, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 235,235 n.1 (1980). As noted above,
it is appealing to take the position that addition of a noncommercial element should not
protect otherwise commercial speech. The contractual analysis deals with this problem
by treating regulations dealing with the contractual function of speech differently from
those dealing with the informative function. Farber, supra note 13, at 387-88. This does
not seem to resolve the problem of an effect on the informative function of speech by a
regulation of the contractual function. Like the Court in Central Hudson, Professor Farber
appears to accept the commercial speech level of scrutiny for regulation of informative
speech if such speech also is contractual: "A justification for regulating the seller's speech
relates to the contractual function of the speech if, and only if, the state interest disap-
pears when the same statements are made by a third person with no relation to the trans-
action." Farber, supra note 13, at 388-89. This note suggests that a scalping columnist's
article is an instance in which the speech is contractual, see notes 105-15 & accompanying
text infra, but the commercial speech level of scrutiny is inadequate, see notes 127-92 &
accompanying text infra.
"' One commentator has suggested that under the first definition, an editorial may be
commercial speech. Schaefer, supra note 8, at 39. He noted that a main line of business
for Time, Inc., is forest products, id. n.182 (citing N.Y. Times, June 23, 1978, S D, at 12),
and queried, "Might not an editorial supporting or opposing forest conservation efforts,
for example, be viewed as a form of 'commercial speech' where a significant percentage
of the corporation's business interests involve forest products manufacturing?" Schaefer,
supra note 8, at 39 (footnote omitted). This note argues that even under the second defini-
tion, the editorial content of a newspaper may be commercial speech.
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THE CASE OF THE SCALPING COLUMNIST
In Zweig v. Hearst Corp.," defendant Campbell, a columnist for a daily
newspaper, bought 5,000 shares of stock in American Systems, Inc. (ASI),
for $10,000 two days before his column about ASI appeared.13 The plain-
tiffs made an offer of proof which included an expert's opinion that the
column caused an increase in the bid price of the thinly traded stock.,
The day after publication of the article, the columnist sold 2,000 shares
for $10,000 and thus recovered his entire investment.15 Reasonable in-
ferences were drawn that'the defendant knew the column would increase
the stock price and that he intended to profit." The column did not disclose
the defendant's ownership of stock and intent to profit, his practice of
scalping stocks of companies about which he wrote, or the reprinting of
his columns as advertisements for the subject companies in a financial
journal in which he owned an interest. 7 The Court determined that the
defendant should have disclosed these facts. 8
The Scalper's Column as Commercial Speech
Determination of whether the scalping columnist's article is commer-
594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). Although the district court in Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,
407 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979), made findings of
fact in granting the defendant columnist's motion to dismiss, the court of appeals deemed
the motion to be in effect a motion for summary judgment and viewed the facts in the
light most favorable to the parties opposing the motion. 594 F.2d at 1263-64. This note
applies the view of the facts by the court of appeals.
' 594 F.2d at 1264. The columnist interviewed three ASI officials who were silent about
problems confronting ASI, and he did no independent research before publication of the
column. Id. The column contained erroneous statements casting ASI in a more favorable
light than it deserved, but the court assumed the columnist did not know that these
misleading parts of the article were false. Id. at 1264-65. Without knowledge of the colum-
nist's ownership of stock, the newspaper determined that the column was newsworthy.
See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
' 594 F.2d at 1265.
95 Id.
9 Id.
' Id. at 1265-67.
9' Id. at 1268, 1271. An additional circumstance was that plaintiffs were shareholders
in Reading Guidance Center, Inc. (RGC), which contractually committed itself to sell its
assets to ASI before publication of defendant's column. Id. at 1269. ASI's payment for the
assets was to be in stock worth $1,800,000 at a future date, which date turned out to be
during the period when the column allegedly was causing a rise in the stock price, so that
plaintiffs received less stock than they otherwise would have received and became minor-
ity rather than majority shareholders in ASI. Id. at 1269-70. The court decided that RGC's
reliance on a free and unmanipulated market was sufficient to impose a duty on defendant
to RGC. Id. at 1270. This decision drew a dissent, id. at 1271-72 (Eli, J., dissenting), and
has been criticized, see Note, The Ninth Circuit Expands the lob-5 Net to Catch a Columnist-
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 29 DEPAUL L. REv. 287 (1979); contra, Note, A Financial Columnist's
Duty to the Market Under Rule lob-5: Civil Damages for Trading on a Misleading Investment
Recommendation, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1021 (1980); 19 WASHBURN L.J. 382, 387-88 (1980).
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cial speech requires determination of whether the column proposes a com-
mercial transaction." By definition,' a scalping column recommends a
commercial transaction-the purchase of a specifically named security-
and the columnist who makes the recommendation is one of the sellers
in the market in which persons who follow the recommendation will make
their purchases. The columnist's recommendation is a proposal of a com-
mercial transaction. The Court has used the word "propose" to include
part of a7proposal,"' and a recommendation by a seller to buy his product
is at least part of a proposal of a transaction.
Indeed, to say that a seller who recommends the product sold rather
than directly proposing a sale of the product is engaged in noncommer-
cial speech would be to place form over substance. That the columnist
has not made the proposal to a specific buyer does not matter; advertis-
ing is directed to a general audience and nevertheless may be commer-
cial speech. That the buyer of the columnist's security may not have read
or even heard of the columnist's recommendation does not matter; adver-
tising is no less commercial speech when the advertisement does not cause
sales."0 2 Finally, that the columnist does not reveal his identity as a seller
does not render the speech noncommercial. On the contrary, that a per-
son might engage in commercial speech without disclosing his identity
is a concern of the Court."3
In addition to satisfying the Court's definition,'" identification of the
scalping columnist's article as commercial speech fits the analysis of com-
mercial speech as a potential part of a contract of sale.115 The columnist,
a potential party to a sale, makes representations about the security, but
does not disclose his ownership of the security or, as in Zweig v. Hearst
Corp.," his intent to profit from sale of the security. Under contract law,
See notes 65-91 & accompanying text supra.
10 For the definition of scalping, see text accompanying notes 2 & 3 supra.
101 For example, a trade name may be part of a proposal of a commercial transaction.
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. at 11.
10 The buyer who did not read the column might claim an injury as a consequence of
the column on the ground that once the recommendation caused some people to purchase,
the complaining buyer made a purchase because of the movement in the stock resulting
from the recommendation. Neither a scalper's column nor advertising must result in a sale,
however, in order to be commercial speech.
"I The Court cited such a concern in Friedman v. Rogers when it upheld a ban on prac-
ticing optometry under a trade name. 440 U.S. at 12-16. For discussion of Friedman, see
text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
10 At least some scalpers' columns also may fit the definition that commercial speech
relates solely to the economic interests of the speaker and the audience, In re R._. M.
J_., 50 U.S.L.W. at 4189 n.17; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. at 561. The columnist's sole purpose in recommending the stock may be personal
profit, and the reader's sole purpose in reading the recommendation may be personal pro-
fit. These are questions of fact; how they will be resolved in any particular case may be
uncertain. The subject matter of the recommendation also is economic: the scalper recom-
mends a purchase of the company's stock.
"' See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
1 See notes 92-98 & accompanying text supra.
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"[a] person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an
assertion that the fact does not exist [if]: (a) ... he knows that disclosure
of the fact is necessary 'to prevent some previous assertion from being
a misrepresentation or from being fraudulent or material.""' A fact is
material if the person who does not disclose it "knows or has reason to
know [that the fact] will influence the other [person] in determining his
course of action.""1 8 In the case of scalping, the columnist seems to have
reason to know that his ownership of the security and his intent to sell
the security are facts which would influence a potential buyer's action.
Therefore, these facts are material.' An assertion is fraudulent "[i]f a
fact is intentionally withheld for the purpose of inducing action.""' The
scalping columnist withholds facts at least partly for the purpose of enabl-
ing himself to trade on the rise he expects in the market when buyers
act in accordance with the recommendation. Hence, the nondisclosure is
also fraudulent."' For these two reasons, the columnist's nondisclosure
is equivalent to an assertion that the facts of his ownership and intent
to trade do not- exist. "A misrepresentation is an assertion that is not
in accord with the facts.""' The columnist's nondisclosure, treated as
equivalent to an assertion, fits this definition."' The misrepresentation
is a commitment which may make a contract voidable."" Under the con-
"o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979).
"o Id. Comment b (citing id. S 162(2)). One view is that in securities law, a fact is material
if there is a "substantial likelihood" that a reasonable person would consider the fact im-
portant in deciding on a course of conduct. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d at 1266; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 931 (4th ed. 1977). But see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
"0 Courts have found the facts that a scalper owns a security and plans to sell the security
after publication of the recommendation to buy to be material, though the courts were
not applying the precise definition in the text. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1963); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d at 1265-66.
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 161, Comment b (1979); see id. § 162(1).
111 In order to have an action, such as for voiding a contract, against the maker of the
misrepresentation, a person may have to prove justifiable reliance. See id. S 164. Other
than in the cases of assertions of opinion, id. SS 168-169, assertions as to matters of law,
id, S 170, assertions of intention, id. § 171, and fault, id. § 172, "the requirement of justification
is usually met unless, for example, the fact to which the misrepresentation relates is of
only peripheral importance to the transaction or is one as to which the maker's assertion
would not be expected to be taken seriously." Id. § 164, Comment d. Under the contractual
analysis, the commitment need only be potentially part of a contract of sale for the speech
to be distinguished as commercial. See note 72 & accompanying text supra. The misrepresen-
tation in the scalper's column bears the potential that a reader will rely on the column's
recommendation and contract to purchase the scalper's securities. This potential reliance
is thus sufficient for the reliance element in the contractual analysis of commercial speech.
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (1979).
113 "[A] half-truth may be as misleading as an assertion that is wholly false." Id. Com-
ment b.
... Id. § 164.
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tractual analysis, this commitment serves to identify the column contain-
ing the recommendation as commercial speech.115
Independence of Liability from Commercial Speech Analysis
The federal government has sought to regulate speech incidental to
securities transactions through section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19341 and rule 10b-51 17 promulgated thereunder. These provisions
are aimed at discouraging securities transactions based on misinforma-
tion."'
One requirement violated by a scalping columnist is rule 10b-5(b),1 9
which prohibits a misleading omission of a material fact from a statement
made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The colum-
nist has made statements about the security, including a recommendation
to buy, in a misleading manner by omitting the material facts that he
"I Although the scalper's fraudulent misrepresentation fits the contractual analysis,
whether speech is commercial depends on whether it proposes a commercial transaction,
see notes 65-91 & accompanying text supra, rather than on whether it contains a misrepresen-
tation. Hence, a recommendation by a columnist who discloses stock ownership also would
be commercial speech.
Another example of commercial speech occurs when a journalist is paid to recommend
a security. The recommendation is in effect a proposal of a commercial transaction, see
text accompanying notes 101 & 102 supra, and the payment makes this proposal similar
to an advertisement prepared and published by a newspaper for an advertiser.
Some journalists accept gifts from businesses about which they write stories. See, e.g.,
McNeely, Come Along on Fat Albert's Big Junket: For a jolly-good flight from Dallas to Lon-
don and back, QUmL, Apr. 1978, at 30. Whether such a story is commercial speech seems to
depend on whether the journalist writes a favorable story in exchange for the "gift." Whether
a story was written in exchange for a gift rather than as an exercise of the journalist's
news judgment independent of the gift seems to be an issue of fact and consequently a
source of uncertainty. For discussion of the effects of uncertainty in the identification of
commercial speech, see text accompanying notes 187 & 188 infra.
A person who by use of interstate commerce or the mails circulates a publication which
describes a security in return for undisclosed consideration from an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer violates federal securities law. Securities Act of 1933, S 17(b), 15 U.S.C. 5 77q(b)
(1976); see United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 364-65 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
918, 932 (1971), 404 U.S. 823 (1971) (upholding conviction of publisher of investment newsletter
who failed to disclose that publication of misleading article was in return for promise of
payment); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d at 1264 n.5 (noting but not reaching issue of
whether columnist's purchase of stock at bargain price was receipt of consideration). The
Amick court saw "no significant abridgment of freedom of the press in requiring disclosure
of a promise of payment if there has been one." 439 F.2d at 365 (footnote omitted). Publica-
tion of an article such as that in Amick seems at least tantamount to fraud, however. Liability
for this publication does not depend on treatment of the article as commercial speech. See
text accompanying notes 122-25 infra. Thus, Amick properly did not apply a commercial
speech analysis. See 439 F.2d at 364-65.
' 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 4 supra.
17 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1981). For the text of this rule, see note 5 supra.
"' See generally SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963),
quoted in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
11 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5(b) (1981). For the text of this clause, see note 5 supra.
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owns the security and intends to trade on the rise in the market follow-
ing the recommendation.12 This renders the columnist liable for damages
to a person who buys from the columnist, at least in cases in which the
buyer relies on the recommendation.
121
A scalping columnist's liability to a purchaser after publication of the
article, however, does not depend on finding the column to be commer-
cial speech. At common law, as under the securities statute, the colum-
nist has a duty to disclose as a result of being a party to a business trans-
action and having knowledge of matters "that he knows to be necessary
to prevent his. partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being
misleading."'" However, liability need not be stated so as to depend on
the existence of a commercial transaction. One who makes a representa-
tion which the maker knows is materially misleading because it is
incomplete"D may be liable to a person or class of persons whom the maker
' Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d at 1265-66.
I The columnist also may be liable to others. For instance, the plaintiffs in Zweig were
not parties to a business transaction with the columnist in that case. See id. at 1263, 1265.
One commentator has suggested that another theory of liability when a scalping colum-
nist purchases a security before publication of the column recommending the security is
that the columnist is liable for nondisclosure of the material fact that the article is impend-
ing. Peskind, supra note 3, at 89, 92-96. Because in such a situation the columnist has
not yet made a statement, potential liability under rule 10b-5 on the basis of this non-
disclosure would seem to depend on rule 10b-5(a) & (c). See Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 225 n.5 (1980); rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1981). Liability on this theory
seems dubious because of the holding in Chiarella that liability under S 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976), for silence "is premised upon a duty to
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transac-
tion." 445 U.S. at 230. This "relationship of trust and confidence" apparently is at least
similar to the "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence," RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS 5 551(2)(a) (1976), quoted in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 228, from
which a duty to disclose arises under a tort theory at common law, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS S 551(2) (1976). At least at common law, a newspaper columnist does not seem to
owe a fiduciary duty to his readers. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d at 1269; Peskind, supra
note 3, at 85, 90. To hold all newspaper writers to the high standards of a fiduciary almost
surely would have a chilling effect and seems contrary to the policies behind freedom of
speech and of the press, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70(1964). For a suggestion that a financial columnist to some extent has a fiduciary bond
with the columnist's readers, however, see Brudney, supra note 3, at 369. The Supreme
Court has said in another context: "The extraordinary protections afforded by the First
Amendment carry with them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the
protected rights responsibly-a duty widely acknowledged but not always observed by
editors and publishers." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976). Because
of the potential chilling effect, this "something in the nature of a fiduciary duty" would
seem not to rise to the level of the "relationship of trust and confidence" required by
Chiarella. Indeed, the context of the comment in Nebraska Press Ass'n suggests a lesser
duty than that required by Chiarella. The sentence following the sentence quoted above
is: "It is not asking too much to suggest that those who exercise First Amendment rights
in newspapers or broadcasting enterprises direct some effort to protect the-rights of an
accused to a fair trial by unbiased jurors." 427 U.S. at 560.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 551(2)(b) (1976).
1 Id. 5 529.
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has reason to expect to act in justifiable reliance on the incomplete
statement.' Hence, what matters is not that a scalping columnist is engag-
ing in a commercial transaction, but rather that the columnist is making
a fraudulent misrepresentation. 12 Nevertheless, the scalping columnist's
article fits the definition of commercial speech. 26
Implications of Treating a Newspaper Column as Commercial Speech
The Uncertain Borders of Commercial Speech
Treatment of the editorial contents of a newspaper as commercial speech
could have a chilling effect on journalists beyond the effect of knowledge
that journalists are liable for fraudulent misrepresentation. 1 7 The extent
of such treatment is uncertain because the borders of the definition of
commercial speech are undetermined. This uncertainty and the ability
of government to regulate commercial speech could chill some journalists'
speech.
Four problems demonstrate the haziness of the definition of commer-
cial speech. The first is that it is unclear whether the speaker must pro-
pose the commercial transaction only on his own behalf or on the behalf
2 Id. S 531; see James & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part I, 37 MD. L. REV. 488,524 (1978).
22 One might argue that liability is in tort rather than in contract, and that the case
of a scalping columnist therefore does not fit the contractual analysis of commercial speech
despite the analysis in the text accompanying notes 105-15 supra. It is true that the Supreme
Court has analyzed liability under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1981), by analogy to
tort law. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980). However, the contrac-
tual analysis of commercial speech does not turn on whether the speech is potentially a
basis for liability in tort as well as potentially part of a contract of sale. See note 72 &
accompanying text supra. The case simply is that a misrepresentation may be the basis
for a tort claim as well as for a contract claim:
A misrepresentation may also be the basis for an affirmative claim for liability
for mispresentation under the law of torts. Such liability for misrepresenta-
tion is dealt with in the Restatement, Second, Torts. See Restatement, Se-
cond, Torts chs. 22, 23. The rules stated there conform generally to those stated
here. However, because tort law imposes liability in damages for misrepresen-
tation, while contract law does not, the requirements imposed by contract law
are in some instances less stringent. Notably, under tort law a misrepresenta-
tion does not give rise to liability for fraudulent misrepresentation unless it
is both fraudulent and material, while under contract law a misrepresentation
may make a contract voidable if it is either fraudulent or material.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Ch. 7, Topic 1, Introductory Note (1979). Moreover,
much of the tort law of misrepresentation involves commercial transactions. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 529, Comment c, Illustrations 1, 2 (1976). Two commen-
tators have suggested the contract theory of an implied warranty of disinterestedness as
a basis for liability of a scalping columnist. Brudney, supra note 3, at 369; Peskind, supra
note 3, at 88-92.
"' See text accompanying notes 99-115 supra.
Like the chilling effect of liability for libel, the chilling effect for liability for fraudulent
misrepresentation seems desirable. See Comment, Testing the Vicarious Liability of a
Newspaper Publisher Under lob-5-Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 1975 UTAH L. REv. 740, 749.
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of someone by whom he has been hired,12 or whether he might also engage
in commercial speech by proposing a commercial transaction on behalf
of another person, such as a near relative with whom the speaker has
a close relationship.' If the proposal may only be for the benefit of the
speaker, near relatives might circumvent regulations on commercial speech
by proposing commercial transactions on each others' behalves. If the pro-
posal may be for the benefit of another, whether a particular relationship
would be close enough to make the speech commercial would likely be
uncertain.
A related problem involves whether an article in a newspaper might
be viewed as speech on behalf of another corporation. This could occur
in two ways. First, several officers and directors of newpaper corpora-
tions are also officers and directors of other corporations.13 If'a
newspaper's officer or director is found to be acting on behalf of the sec-
ond corporation as well as of the newspaper13' when he participates in
a decision to publish a favorable story'32 in the newspaper about the sec-
ond corporation, that story could then be considered commercial speech.
Second, the newspaper may be a parent or subsidiary of a corporation
which engages in other lines of business, or both- the newspaper and the
second corporation may be subsidiaries of the same parent.", In any of
these cases, an article related to the second corporation's line of business
could be considered speech on behalf of the second corporation.'
The third problem is that it is unclear what constitutes a proposal of
a commercial transaction. It seems that a seller's recommendation of a
purchase of the seller's product should be considered a proposal to engage
in a commercial transaction." A requirement that a proposal or a recom-
mendation be direct, however, would be unduly formalistic. As one com-
" Examples of commercial speech on behalf of another are an advertisement placed
for a client by an advertising agency and an advertisement published by a newspaper as
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
12 Cf. Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975) (matching of director's sales
with wife's purchases in finding liability under S 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1976)).
" Dreier & Weinberg, Interlocking Directorates, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1979,
at 51.
"I Another potential consequence of the interlocking directorate is that if the newspaper's
officer or director, when he serves as a director of the second corporation, is acting on
behalf of the newspaper to the extent that he has been "deputized" under S 16(b) of the'
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1976), and if the newspaper corpora-
tion trades in the second corporation's stock, the newspaper corporation may be treated as
a director of the second corporation and therefore liable to the second corporation for "short-
swing" profits which fall within the provisions of S 16(b). See Feder v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
'¢ For discussion of a favorable feature story, see text accompanying notes 136 & 137 infra.
13 See Schaefer, supra note 8, at 13 & n.61, 39 n.182.
See id. at 39.
" See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
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mentator said of an indirect recommendation to buy securities, in the form
of a feature story: "Wooden adherence to the form of the distribution
of corporate information will not advance the integrity of the principles
of securities legislation.""3 8 Similarly, wooden adherence to the phrasing
of speech rather than to its message will not advance the integrity of
the principles of the first amendment. To cause the determination of
whether certain speech is commercial to turn on whether the word "recom-
mend" is used, for instance, would be to invite circumvention of the defini-
tion of commercial speech. The difficulty of determining when the message
is sufficient to constitute a proposal, however, creates uncertainty. Such
uncertainty would arise, for example, in determining whether a feature
story is favorable in a manner which amounts to a recommendation.13
The fourth problem is the potential difficulty in determining whether
a person proposing a commercial transaction is speaking as a seller. The
proposal of a commercial transaction requires speech by or on behalf of
a seller.' A merchant who proposes purchase of the type of goods in
which he regularly trades,'1 or a professional who proposes use of a ser-
vice which he provides, 140 appears to be a seller. Similarly, a newspaper
financial columnist who has engaged in a pattern of selling stock' might
be considered a seller of stock. However, a person who sells on only one
occasion also might be a seller. An ordinance regulating "For Sale" signs
on lawns, for instance, might reach persons selling their own houses.'
Whether a person who is not an issuer, broker, or dealer, but who owns
securities and recommends purchase of them, is proposing purchase of
his securities would seem to depend on whether that person intends to
sell at the time of the making of the recommendation." A sale immediately
following the recommendation would be evidence, although not conclusive,
IS Peskind, supra note 3, at 85.
13 Similar uncertainty would arise from an unfavorable story written about a company
by a columnist who plans to purchase the company's stock after the story causes a decline
in the price of the stock.
1" "How ... does commercial speech differ from noncommercial speech? One obvious
distinction is that the commercial speaker not only talks about a product, but also sells
it." Farber, supra note 13, at 386; see Rotunda, supra note 48, at 1090. For a discussion
of buyers as commercial speakers, see note 72 supra.
3 See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (electricity); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prescription drugs).
10 See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (optometrists); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (attorneys); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(attorneys); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (pharmacists).
" The columnist in Zweig engaged in scalping more than 20 times. 594 F.2d at 1264 n.4.
See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 86.
' Cf. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d at 1271 (scalping columnist omits material facts
by failing to disclose ownership of security and intent to profit from recommendation of
the security).
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of intent to sell." The length of time an owner of securities who recom-
mends their purchase must wait before selling in order to attenuate the
probative value of the sale as evidence of intent would be an additional
source of uncertainty. Intent also might be more easily inferred if the
seller had purchased the securities, rather than receiving them as a gift
or inheritance, especially if the purchase was made shortly before the
recommendation to buy. 4
5
The Potential, for Regulation
Commercial speech may be regulated to prevent it from being decep-
tive or misleading. 146 The potential effects of governmental regulation may
be seen from the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,' an example of regula-
tion designed to prevent deception and the dissemination of misleading
commercial information.' 48 This example is especially apt because an in-
vestment adviser might engage in scalping.149
The application of provisions similar to those contained in the Invest-
ment Advisers Act to a newspaper columnist could result in various forms
141 If the speaker has not previously sold securities, he might be considered to have in-
tended to sell only if a sale follows his recommendation to buy. Requiring at least one
sale in order to infer an intent to sell, however, would seem to strain the present definition
of commercial speech in order to avoid imposing prior regulations on a person who turns
out not to sell. Government then would be able to regulate commercial speech in order
to prevent it from being fraudulent and misleading only in the sense that government
could attempt to deter fraudulent or misleading speech by imposing civil liability or a criminal
penalty after the speech, or imposing those limitations on time, place, and manner of speech
which would be permissible on noncommercial speech. In indicating that commercial speech
may be regulated to prevent it from being deceptive or misleading, the Supreme Court
seemed to suggest the permissibility of other regulations too. See Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. at 9-10; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 383-84; Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 770-72.
145 Cf. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d at 1264 (scalping columnist purchased stock he
was scalping two days before publication of his recommendation).
14. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. at 9-10; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 383-84;
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 770-72.
1,7 15 U.S.C. 5 80b (1976). The act defines "investment adviser" so as to exclude, among
others, a publisher of a bona fide newspaper:
"Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation, engages in
the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of
a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning
securities; but does not include ... (D) the publisher of any bona fide newspaper,
news magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular cir-
culation ....
Id. S 80b-2(a)(11). The Securities and Exchange Commission staff has suggested that the ex-
emption does not cover an independent contractor who writes a financial column, see note
200 infra, but whether the exemption covers a columnist who is a regular full-time employee
of a newspaper is unclear.
.48 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-92 (1963).
49 See id. at 181-82.
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of regulation of a columnist's speech. The regulation could lead to
registration,1" disclosure of notes and sources of information to a govern-
ment agency, the possibility of prior restraint, and the possibility of an
injunction requiring publication of statements of disclosure.
Registration under the Investment Advisers Act requires disclosure
of considerable business information,"1 including the manner of render-
ing advice and analysis 5' and the business affiliations for the past ten
years of not only the investment adviser, but also of persons who control
or are controlled by the investment adviser.1" Such persons might well
be found to include the columnist's editors and publisher. Application for
registration requires a $150 nonrefundable fee. 5
The Investment Advisers Act could require disclosure of sources of
information in three ways. At registration, the applicant must describe
sources of information.' An apparently more exacting requirement is the
keeping of records subject at any time to reasonable examinations by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.1 5 Records include "accounts,
correspondence, memorandums, tapes, discs, papers, books, and other
documents or transcribed information of any type, whether expressed in
ordinary or machine language."15 7 This definition would seem to include
a journalist's notes."' Moreover, in deciding whether to seek to restrain
an investment adviser when it appears that the Investment Advisers Act
has been or is about to be violated, the commission may require the per-
son violating or about to violate the act to file a written statement "as
to all the facts and circumstances relevant to such violation, and may
otherwise investigate all such facts and circumstances."15 9
The commission may impose prior restraint in two ways." First, the
' For a more extended discussion of registration under the Investment Advisers Act
and its applicability to financial publications, see Harroch, The Applicability of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 to Financial and Investment Related Publications, 5 J. CORPORA-
TION L. 55 (1979).
151 15 U.S.C. S 80b-3(c) (1976).
'' Id. S 80b-3(c)(1)(C).
' Id. S 80b-3(c)(1)(B).
's 17 C.F.R. S 275.208-3 (1981).
" Form ADV, Part H; Item 4(b), reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 57,101, at 44,327
(1981).
, 15 U.S.C. S 80b-4 (1976).
'1 Id. S 78c(a)(37). This definition is incorporated into the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 for purposes of the section requiring records. Id. S 80b-4.
"I It appears that the Securities and Exchange Commission does not by rule require
an investment adviser to retain all notes. See 17 C.F.R. 5 275.204-2 (1981).
"' 15 U.S.C. S 80b-9(a) (1976).
" The court in SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S 958 (1970), said that the Investment Advisers Act "grants no authority for review
or censorship by the Commission of investment advisory material prior to its publication."
422 F.2d at 1380 n.13. For the reasons in the text accompanying notes 161 & 162 infra,
the commission nevertheless appears able to engage in prior restraint.
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commission may prevent certain persons from lawfully giving investment
advice by denying or suspending registration for cause after a hearing.'61
Second, the commission may obtain an injunction against a practice which
violates the Investment Advisers Act. 62
The commission also might require publication of statements of disclo-
sure under two provisions. First, the provision on keeping records per-
mits the commission to require dissemination of information. 161 Second,
the commission may obtain an injunction" which requires disclosure of
information, such as a practice of scalping.16 5
The requirements of registration, including the work necessary to assure
accuracy of the disclosures in the application as well as payment of the
fee, might deter a newspaper from reporting on and analyzing securities
and their issuers despite the significant role which corporations play in
modern society. Although the Supreme Court has determined that the
first amendment does not protect a newspaper from the burdens of com-
pliance with regulatory statutes such as federal labor laws'" and antitrust
laws, 7 the Court has not yet dealt with the application of a statute which
goes so far as to require registration of a journalist for reasons related
to the editorial content of his articles." To the extent that accurate speech
about corporations and their securities is chilled, investors and the
marketplace, as well as voters reviewing economic decisions by govern-
mental officials, will suffer.
A greater deterrent to a journalist's speech probably would result from
requirement that the journalist's notes and other information about his
sources be available to a government agency because they are records.6 9
,6, 15 U.S.C. 5 80b-3(e) (1976).
" Id. § 80b-9(e).
" Id. S 80b-4.
164 Id. 5 80b-9(e).
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S 180, 196-97 (1963) (injunction
may require investment adviser to disclose practice of trading on effect of the adviser's
recommendation); cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (it may be appropriate to require a commercial message to
include "such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to pre-
vent its being deceptive").
16 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 382-83
(1973); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946); Mabee v.
White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
103, 130-33 (1937).
167 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 382-83
(1973); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7, 19-20 (1945).
'" The Court has indicated that a newspaper corporation is subject to federal securities
law, including the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. SS
77a-77aa (1976). See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967). Curtis Publishing,
however, did not address the issue of regulation of the editorial content of a newspaper.
" See generally Comment, The Chilling Effect in Press Cases: Judicial Thumb on the Scales,
15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 685, 699-706 (1980).
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The Court has permitted access to a journalist's information after a par-
ticularized showing of a need for such access. 17 It has also held that a
journalist, as any other citizen, must testify before a grand jury in-
vestigating whether a crime has been committed, even if this compromises
a confidential source of the journalist.' In addition, a subpoena by an
administrative agency seeking to obtain papers showing the source and
receipt of news from outside a state has been upheld.17 ' This subpoena
was for purposes of enforcing a wage and hour law, however, rather than
for purposes of regulating the editorial content of the newspaper,'73 and
the Court did not discuss the impact of the subpoena on the editorial
content. 7' The Court has not gone so far as to require the keeping of
17 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) ("public figure" plaintiff in libel action, who
had to prove knowing or reckless falsehood in order to recover, may inquire into state
of mind of journalist alleged to have libeled plaintiff); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547 (1978) (law enforcement personnel may search newsroom for evidence after obtaining
search warrant based on finding of probable cause that newspaper possessed evidence of
a crime in which the newspaper was not involved).
"I Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
17 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). The subpoena is in
327 U.S. at 210 n.46.
" Id. at 189-93.
1 In SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
958 (1970), the Court cited Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946),
in upholding a subpoena by the Securities and Exchange Commission for records in order
to determine whether a financial publication was subject to regulation under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act or was a "bona fide newspaper" within the exclusion of 15 U.S.C. S
80b-2(a)(11)(D) (1976). 422 F.2d at 1380-81. The subpoena requested the production of "[all
documents, agreements, memoranda, correspondence and any other writings relating or
containing reference to the obtaining of reports, comments, management speeches and any
other written materials for publication in the Wall Street Transcript:' Id. at 1374 n.4. The
court characterized the subpoenaed papers as "certain correspondence and advertising
materials which appear to be directly related to an investigation of the type of practices
which might cause a newspaper to fall outside the Act's exclusion:' Id. at 1381. The court
thought the subpoena would not unduly restrict the publication's expression. Id. This is
different from a requirement of registration and continuing regulation.
The analysis of commercial speech raises the question of whether a publication such
as that in Wall St. Transcript Corp. may be subject to governmental regulation. In Wall
St. Transcript Corp. the publishers of the speech did not hold a financial interest in the
securities discussed and therefore seem not to have engaged in commercial speech. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has said, "Numerous examples could be cited of communica-
tions that are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange
of information about securities, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (CA2 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)... :' Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S at 456.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, involved information held by persons trading in the securities
and a statement made by the corporation whose securities were being traded. One com-
mentator has suggested that subscription advisory newsletters.are less like commercial
speech and "are more akin to traditional press publications in that they contain informa-
tion and opinion not primarily about the advisers' own services or products, but about
the merits of products (in this case, investments) sold by others, often mixed with the
traditional news about economic events:' Schoeman, Subscription Advisers, Blue Sky Regula-
tion and the First Amendment, 33 Bus. LAW. 249, 250 (1977). This commentator suggested
that subscription advice must be subject to reasonable regulation, including the Invest-
ment Advisers Act, Schoeman, supra, at 250-51, but that state laws on registration of
subscription advisers curtail the advisers' first amendment rights, id. at 252-62.
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records which describe the source of the editorial content of a newspaper
and which are to be available for inspection by a governmental agency.
The opportunity for prior restraint is contrary to a strong first amend-
ment policy against such restraint.175 "Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to [the Supreme] Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity."'17 The party seeking the restraint "thus
carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such
a restraint."'" The Court has suggested that commercial speech may be
subject to prior restraint under less stringent standards than these.178
One such standard appears to be that the restraint be a restriction which
"is not more extensive than is necessary to serve"" the governmental
interest asserted."8 This standard seems to afford more ready approval
of a prior restraint than the usual standard, whose heavy burden of show-
ing justification for such a restraint appears to require a showing not
only that the restraint is no more extensive than necessary for a govern-
mental interest, but also that the governmental interest is sufficient to
overcome the first amendment interest at stake.81 The Court has not in-
dicated that the lesser standard applies to the editorial content of a
newspaper.
A policy which runs counter not only to requiring statements of disclo-
sure, but also to prior restraint, is the policy that journalists, not the
government, should determine a newspaper's editorial content. 1' Although
17" Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-62 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1971); Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
181 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967) (plurality opinion); Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-23 (1931).
178 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963), quoted in Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980) (per curiam); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
181 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965).
I" Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971), quoted in Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
178 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
at 771 n.24; see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 383.
'" Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 566.
180 Id.
8I See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971) (in case challeng-
ing restraint of pamphleteering entitled to full first amendment protection, "the courts
do not concern themselves with the truth or validity of the publication"); Carroll v. Presi-
dent of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) (indicating that the governmental interest
for "[an order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be ... the pin-pointed
objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order").
But see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 599-600
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (one can virtually always find a less restrictive regulation).
1 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973); Columbia Broad-
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this policy may be phrased in terms of protecting political speech,"n the
role played by large corporations in modern society renders difficult any
distinction between comment on political and related societal effects of
corporate behavior and comment merely on the value of an investment."
The policy is not strong enough to prevent the government from requir-
ing a newspaper to publish a statement of ownership in order to receive
the privilege of using the mails at a reduced rate. 8 5 The justification for
this requirement, however, is that such a privilege is at public expense
and is "not any ... general regulation of what should be published in
newspapers."'88 Moreover, because determination of what facts are
material and therefore must be disclosed requires judgment about whether
a person has reason to know that a fact would influence another person's
decision, the government might have considerable leeway in determining
the contents of a disclosure statement under a statute like the Invest-
ment Advisers Act. This leeway could chill speech more than the postal
regulation. The diminished protection afforded commercial speech would
permit such regulation of an article written by a journalist about a com-
pany in whose shares he trades or intends to trade with benefit from
the article.
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS FOR
DEFINITION AND TREATMENT OF "COMMERCIAL" SPEECH
Because of the uncertain limits of commercial speech18 and the regula-
tion permitted when speech is treated as commercial, treatment of any
editorial content of a newspaper as commercial speech is likely to have
a chilling effect. Even without regulation, journalists even somewhat
removed from a financial interest in a subject may be reluctant to discuss
it due to uncertainty whether they might be inviting regulation. The
casting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973); see Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 828-29 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967).
"3E.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
'" See text accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra. The Court has noted that even commer-
cial speech may "enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy." Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 765 (footnote omitted);
see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 364.
"I Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 314-16 (1913). A current disclosure pro-
vision is the statute making it a crime punishable by a $500 fine to print editorial matter
in exchange for consideration in a publication entered as second class mail without mark-
ing the matter "advertisement." 18 U.S.C. S 1734 (1976). Such matter is similar to an arti-
cle about a security published for compensation without disclosure of the compensation.
See note 115 supra.
,' Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 316 (1913).
"* The definition of a newspaper poses a related problem, Harroch, supra note 150, at
69-73, 79-80, but some newspapers so clearly are bona fide that a court may take judicial
notice. See Person v. New York Post Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 573
F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977).
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number of journalists who have a no more than somewhat removed in-
terest, like the number of officers of newspaper corporations who serve
as directors of other corporations, may be quite high. To guard the in-
dependence of the press, the editorial content of a newspaper should
receive the protection afforded noncommercial speech. A commercial
speech analysis will not suffice unless it protects such content. The sec-
ond definition in Central Hudson & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission- speech proposing a commercial transaction'" -places part
of the editorial content of a newspaper in a category receiving diminish-
ed protection. The extent of that protection is controlled by a four-part
analysis:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest. "
This analysis fails to balance the interest in any particular instance of
commercial speech against the government's interest in regulating that
instance of speech. Instead, the Court's analysis assumes that the interest
in all commercial speech is less than any substantial governmental inter-
est in regulation and requires only that regulation directly advance the
governmental interest and not be more extensive than necessary."o
The analogy to the Investment Advisers Act illustrates the deficiency
of the Central Hudson analysis. The governmental interest in protecting
securities markets is substantial. Registration of investment advisers
enables the government to identify persons on whom investors rely and
who therefore can influence investors. Disclosure of sources of informa-
tion enables the government to police investment advisers, such as by
identifying conflicts of interest. Prior restraints prevent violations.
Statements of disclosure avoid uninformed reliance on investment advice.
Hence, these regulations directly advance the governmental interest.
Moreover, these regulations are necessary for the fullest possible realiza-
tion of the government's purpose.19' If the government lost one of these
19 447 U.S. at 562.
19 Id. at 566. The test at least arguably is inconsistent with prior cases. Id. at 576-78
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's
test is appropriate for regulations aimed at misleading or coercive speech, and for time,
place, or manner restrictions, but not for regulations intended "to manipulate a private
economic decision that the State cannot or has not regulated or outlawed directly:' Id. at 573.
'" The Central Hudson test may be read as a balancing test. See notes 201-05 & accompa-
nying text infra.
191 But see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 591
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tools, the securities markets would be less protected against fraudulent
investment advice. The deficiency is that the Central Hudson analysis
does not allow for the possibility that somewhat less protection of the
securities markets is a price worth paying in order to protect a first
amendment interest such as financial columnists' discussions of corporate
behavior. Even a financial columnist who discloses his intent to trade a
security after recommending it proposes a commercial transaction and
thereby engages in commercial speech. As a result, the columnist could
be made subject to such regulations.
The case of the'financial columnist thus supports the proposition that
commercial speech has not been sufficiently distinguished from noncom-
mercial speech 192 and provides some support for the position that com-
mercial speech should receive the same first amendment protection as
noncommercial speech. 93 As the column written by a scalping journalist
illustrates, commercial speech may comprise statements which would be
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The test adopted by the Court ... elevates the protection
accorded commercial speech that falls within the scope of the First Amendment to a levql
that is virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial speech").
Because prior restraints prevent speech and therefore are more extensive regulations
than, for example, registration, the Court may find that imposition of prior restraints is
unconstitutional until less extensive regulations have failed. The commission's means of
imposing prior restraints nevertheless may be constitutional because such restraints de-
pend on a showing of cause at a hearing, see text accompanying note 161 supra, or a show-
ing of a violation of the Investment Advisers Act, see text accompanying note 162 supra.
1" Rotunda, supra note 48, at 1091, cited in 1979 Term, supra note 17, at 166 n.46; 1979
Term, supra note 17, at 166; see 11 ENVT'L L. 767, 768 n.5 (1981) (" 'Commercial speech' has
yet to be defined with any precision by the Court, but in general the term refers to business
advertising which solicits a commercial transaction or offers relevant information.").
'" E.g., 1979 Term, supra note 17, at 164-68; Note, Yes, FTC, There Is a Virginia: The
Impact of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
on the Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U.L. REV.
833, 862 (1977); 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640,660 (1976); see Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and
the First Amendment, 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 430,443-50 (1977). Contra, Baker, Commercial Speech:
A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) ("given the existing form
of social and economic relationships in the United States, a complete denial of first amend-
ment protection for commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is required by, first
amendment theory" (footnote omitted)); Roberts, supra note 27, at 115 (the Court's "in-
termediate course," granting commercial speech "some 'lesser degree' of first amendment
protection, offers the proper approach"); Schaefer, supra note 8, at 38 ("few would quarrel
with the need for the distinction").
For an argument that securities prospectuses should receive the same protection from
prior restraint as the traditional press, in part because the rationale that commercial speech
is more durable than political speech does not apply to securities information, see Lively
& Leahy, Prior Restraints, Prisoners, Pornography and Prospectuses: A Generic Concept
of the Press as a Missing Link in First Amendment Analysis, 15 U.S.F.L. REV. 179,196-202
(1980-1981). For an argument "that prior restraint is an inappropriate remedy for the regula-
tion of commercial speech," see Note, Commercial Speech and the FTC: A Point of Depar-
ture From Traditional First Amendment Analysis Regarding Prior Restraint, 16 Naw ENG.
L. REV. 793, 828 (1981).
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protected as social"M or political speech if they were not made by a per-
son proposing a commercial transaction.195
A less drastic solution would be a return to the position in Bigelow
v. Virginia that speech may be "'commercial' in widely varying degrees."'"
Once speech has been identified as at least in part commercial, the test
for regulations could then be the Central Hudson analysis with these
modifications: first, even misleading speech should be subject to no more
extensive regulation than necessary to serve the governmental interests
in the regulation, and second, even a regulation which directly advances
substantial governmental interests and which is no more extensive than
necessary should be invalid if the first amendment interests in the speech
outweigh the governmental interests.'
194 The protection of the first amendment extends beyond political views to cover a wide
range of expression. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) (plurality opin-
ion); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
15 Commercial speech is identified by its content, L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-15, at 654;
Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,
65 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1979); Meiklejohn, supra note 193, at 444; 1979 Term, supra note 17,
at 167, and by the context of a prospective commercial transaction, Jackson & Jeffries,
supra, at 1-2; Meiklejohn, supra note 193, at 444.:The case of the scalping columnist shows
that content which amounts to a proposal of a commercial transaction in the context of
a prospective transaction may not be such a proposal if that same content occurred in
a different context. Similarly, a claim that a drug cures cancer may be commercial speech
if it occurs in an advertisement, but fully protected speech if it occurs in a book not writ-
ten by a seller of the drug. Rotunda, supra note 48, at 1090. Professor-Farber has contend-
ed that regulation of deceptive advertising fits the description of content-based regulation
in Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1491-92, 1498-99 (1975). Farber, supra note 13,
at 388 n.73. Professor Farber has argued that regulation of commercial speech should not
be treated as content-based because a state's interest in regulating contracts is unrelated
to free expression. Id. Regardless of the state's interest, however, commercial speech always
is identified at least in part by its content. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, S 12-15, at 654; Jackson
& Jeffries, supra, at 1-2; Meiklejohn, supra note 193, at 444; 1979 Term, supra note 17,
at 167. Consequently, regulation of commercial speech necessarily is regulation of content.
Cf. Ely, supra, at 1495 (conduct which also is speech is 100% action and 100% expression).
Professors Jackson and Jeffries, in their article arguing against any first amendment pro-
tection for commercial speech, acknowledged that if Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., had "involved political commentary or the publica-
tion of newsworthy information [rather than price advertising], the result would have been
commonplace, and there would have been no occasion for the groundbreaking assertion
of first amendment protection for speech of purely commercial import." Jackson & Jef-
fries, supra, at 16 (footnote omitted). The case of the scalping columnist supports the posi-
tion that newsworthy information may be commercial speech. This contradicts the conten-
tion by Professors Jackson and Jeffries that commercial speech does not contribute to
self-government, Jackson & Jeffries, supra, at 14.
For an analysis challenging the distinction of content-based regulations from content-
neutral regulations, see Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
19 421 U.S. at 826.
1 See id. (test for regulation of speech requires "assessing the First Amendment in-
terest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regula-
tion"). One commentator has asserted that in recent Supreme Court cases, "different forms
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In the case of a scalping columnist, this modified analysis still may per-
mit an injunction forbidding the columnist to trade, but could prohibit
an injunction forbidding publication of the column because the formei in-
junction would satisfy the governmental interest and the latter injunc-
tion therefore would be more extensive than necessary. This remedy would
prevent scalping without imposing a prior restraint on speech,"m and might
prevent the government from dictating at least part of the content of
a newspaper column contrary to the policy of leaving editorial judgments
to journalists. '99
Under the modified test, purely commercial speech would receive at
least the protection of the Central Hudson test, which presumably reflects
the Court's weighing of the first amendment interest in speech which
does no more than propose a commercial transaction. Intermediate speech
such as the scalper's column, however, could receive more protection than
under the commercial-noncommercial dichotomy. Because of the chilling
effect that registration and disclosure of sources would have on journalists,
and the undesirability of prior restraints and government orders about
the publication of information, the balance should be struck against ap-
plication of such regulations to the editorial content of a newspaper."'
Such balancing may even be read as consistent with the Central Hud-
son test. The test requires that there be no less restrictive alternative
which satisfies the governmental interest. Applied straightforwardly, such
an analysis prohibits "only laws that engage in the gratuitous inhibition
of expression,"201 and therefore has been said to invalidate nothing.02
of commercial speech seem to have received different degrees of protection." Note, Restric-
tions on Electric Utility Advertising, 78 MicH. L. REv. 433,435 (1980). Another commentator
has analyzed the plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct.
2882 (1981), to provide "that particular forms of commercial speech may themselves be
entitled to different standards." Note, The Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Prohibition on
Liquor Advertising, 16 TULSA L.J. 734, 781 (1981).
1,0 See text accompanying notes 160-62 & 175-86 supra.
IN See text accompanying notes 163-65 & 182-86 supra. If the misleading column has ap-
peared before issuance of an injunction, a court might wish to require another article disclos-
ing ownership of the recommended security. In a case like Zweig v. Hearst Corp., in which
the newspaper publisher was not at fault for the scalping, 521 F.2d 1129, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1025 (1975), an order to publish a subsequent article seems inappropriate. If the publisher
is liable, on the other hand, an order to publish a disclosure might satisfy even the modified
test.
Before the recent commercial speech cases, and without using a commercial speech
analysis, one commentator suggested that an order requiring disclosure would not violate
the first amendment. Peskind, supra note 3, at 97-98.
Similar application of a balancing test could challenge the indication by the Securities
and Exchange Commission staff that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 applies to a
column written by an investment adviser as an independent contractor for a popular
magazine, Bernard Feuer, [1979] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,954.
201 Ely, supra note 195, at 1485.
2n See id. at 1490. But see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. at 569-72 (invalidating a ban on promotional advertising by an electric utility on
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However, such analysis also may be applied as a balancing test. A balanc-
ing test is "notoriously unreliable," ' 4 but affords some protection 5 and
accommodates the varying first amendment interest as speech varies in
the degree to which it is commercial. 6
In re R_ M. J_ may signal that the Court contemplates such
balancing. The four-part Central Hudson analysis was relegated to a foot-
note in In re R____ M. J ; the standard repeated in the opinion is
that "the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest
served.20 8 In order to compare the extent of the interference to the ex-
tent of the governmental interest, one must measure the interference.
One way to measure the interference is by the degree to which it in-
trudes on the public interests served by the speech at stake. Another
way is to gauge whether the interference is no more extensive than
necessary to serve the governmental interest, regardless of whether the
interference intrudes to a greater degree on some instances of commer-
cial speech than on others. A requirement of disclosure of sources, for
instance, may intrude to a lesser degree on investment advisers, who have
an economic interest at stake, than on articles by newspaper financial
columnists, who may have a political and an economic interest at stake,
even though the requirement in both cases may be no more extensive
than necessary to serve the governmental interest in regulation of
securities markets. Because the second method of measurement is con-
tained in the Central Hudson test,0 9 and because that test 21 followed a
discussion including the proportionality standard, the Court appears to
the ground that the state interest at stake was conservation of energy and the ban pro-
hibited even advertising of energy-saving products).
m Ely, supra note 195, at 1486-87; see John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6,
24 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I do not believe that Central
Hudson was intended to preclude a balancing test when a statute imposes a near-total
ban on one medium of communication."), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 3151 (1981); 11 ENVT'L L. 767,
781, 783 (1981) (describing Central Hudson test as a "balancing test").
"' Ely, supra note 195, at 1490.
" See id.
' Before presenting the four-part test, the majority in Central Hudson acknowledged
that "[t]he protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature
both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation," 447
U.S. at 563. However, this does not make clear whether the Court was recognizing dif-
ferent first amendment interests in varying degrees of commercial speech or was observ-
ing that the extent of the government's regulation will depend in part on the form of the
expression, for example, the billboards in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct.
2882 (1981). That the Central Hudson test divides speech into commercial and noncommer-
cial, see text accompanying note 189 supra, suggests that the court intended the latter.
50 U.S.L.W. at 4189 n.15.
" Id. at 4189 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. at 563-64).
See text accompanying note 189 supra.
2 0 See 447 U.S. at 566.
21 See id. at 564.
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have intended the second method of measuring proportionality. In In re
R M. J_, however, the Court acknowledged that, at least as ap-
plied to advertising of professional services, commercial speech theory
is a "developing area of the law."212 The shift from the focus in Central
Hudson on the four-part analysis to the focus in In re R_ M. J_
on the proportionality standard could indicate recognition of varying in-
terests in commercial speech and of a balancing element in the Central
Hudson test.
CONCLUSION
A newspaper columnist who recommends purchase of a security which
he intends to sell proposes a commercial transaction. Consequently, an
article by a columnist who engages in scalping fits the definition of com-
mercial speech. Subjecting the editorial content of a newspaper to cur-
rent commercial speech analysis is undesirable because the limits on what
editorial content of newspapers might be commercial speech are unclear,
and because commercial speech is subject to regulation which includes
the possibility of burdensome registration of journalists, government ac-
cess to sources of information, prior restraints, and orders about the
editorial content of a publication. For these reasons, the case of the scalp-
ing columnist provides some support for the position that commercial
speech should not be distinguished from noncommercial speech. The
distinction may be retained without permitting governmental regulation
of the editorial content of a newspaper, however, by recognizing that
speech may be commercial in varying degrees and by modifying current
analysis to protect even misleading commercial speech against a regula-
tion which is more extensive than necessary and to balance the govern-
mental interest in regulation of speech which contains both commercial
and noncommercial elements against the first amendment interest in such
speech.
BRUCE A. KOHN
211 50 U.S.L.W. at 4189 n.16.
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